Partnership for Governance(the Mayor's Commission on City Govenment Reform)
Daegu Metropolitan City

The Problem

Daegu is popularly known as the nation’s “third city.” In terms of population and economic vibrancy, it was long considered a pillar of strength. As the nation’s Gross National Product climbed in the 1980s, however, the city lost traction. Textile and industry jobs began moving to lesser-developed lands, small-to-midsized firms began to fail, and working families moved to other cities with better-paying and high-prestige jobs. Civic pride fell.

City managers had no answers. Korea has a 5,000 year of strong centralized authority, and Daegu is known as the hometown of three recent presidents. This had been a source of pride. On the other hand, it could be said that despite the advent of true political democracy, “citizens” did not exist for civil servants, only residents to be “administered.” Local mayors “managed” local affairs through top-down bureaucratic approaches. Citizens, with no other means of input but public rallies that too often turned violent after public authorities sought to control the protests, were left out of nearly every policy consideration. When local elections returned in the mid-1990s, the first three elected mayors continued the tradition of “internal” management.

City staffers were very aware that most of their financial resources were dependent upon the informal administrative guidance provided from national government administrators, and therefore had little reason to “localize” administration. The seniority-driven office culture discouraged active discussions of government policy within the city structure of 4700 public servants, let alone with the citizenry. Instead, all attention was focused on implementing defined targets. Mayors developed mega-projects in response to central government growth schemes, so public management addressed issues of revenue generation and operational effectiveness rather than responsiveness to citizens.

In this environment, innovations from the grassroots had no opportunity to be heard. The city stagnated.

Local and nationwide NGOs, many of which had led the civic protests of earlier years, began advocating for a place in the decision-making process. Many of these groups became highly political, identifying recommended candidates for political office and proposing specific legislation or ideals for prospective administrations. The first three elected mayors in Daegu were not re-elected, clear evidence of the voter’s dissatisfaction with the status-quo.

During the 4th mayoral election (in 2006), citizens dissatisfaction with the conflicts between the city bureaucracy and civic society became increasingly obvious. Newly-elected mayor Bum-il Kim accepted the call for public-private collaboration in government: specifically to include non-governmental participation in policy development and city management through a commission of scholars, experts, businessmen, and representatives of civic NGOs. A governance partnership was born.

Solution and Key Benefits

 What is the initiative about? (the solution)
The Mayor’s Commission on City Government Reform (MCCGR) was created to spearhead change. The mere presence of such a body of “outsiders”, along with the active and fervent support of the mayor, has enabled numerous projects that would never have been considered previously to become focal aspects of the new city administration. Thus the existence of such a Commission (the initiative itself) is a benefit to the city, along with the projects it fostered.

The Mayor’s Commission has changed the attitudes and views of civil society towards the city. The general public, grass-roots organizations, professional NGOs, and scholars all now have a “direct line” to government. As part of the process, NGOs need not be confrontational, but collaborative. “Win-win” is not only possible, it happens, and the newspapers report this.

The Citizen’s Petition for Policy Discussion is a citizen-driven initiative process that requires the relevant departments of city government to hold open public hearings on matters of public interest. Such hearings make clear to the public that the city must consider input from beyond city hall itself, and hearing outcomes are posted on the city hall website. Not only are citizens pleased with enhanced transparency, but public servants are learning to look beyond their own staff for helpful critique prior to policy implementation.

Budget deliberations are a challenge across the globe: in Daegu the Citizens’ Participatory Budgeting policy now allows citizens to help determine budget priorities at the department levels of the city. No longer do city managers arbitrarily define budget figures in their presentations before the city council.

The new Ombudsman center, designed and promoted by the Commission, allows citizens and public servants to initiate investigations of government practices. Where problems are not immediately corrected, the Ombudsman has recourse to the Mayor and Commission. Citizens are empowered, not helpless against bureaucrats.

The program for neighborhood self-improvement (“Good Village”) projects was developed by the Commission to encourage autonomy at the community level. Beyond general guidelines, the bureaucracy has been removed from the conceptualization and operation of these projects, returning decision-making and initiative to citizens. The “Little Mayor” project is similar, except that the project conceptualization and management is by civil servants who, if their project is accepted, are seconded from their regular city tasks to manage their special projects. These programs overcome entrenched bureaucratic mindsets and encourage creative and “bottom-up” solutions to current municipal challenges.

The Commission, by leading the development of legislation from the outside but then through the city administration, has led a change in policy on privatization (consignment) of city tasks and staffing.

Actors and Stakeholders

 Who proposed the solution, who implemented it and who were the stakeholders?
The local branch of the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a nationwide NGO with over 10,000 dues-paying members, proposed a public-private body to increase transparency and input from civil society in Daegu city administration prior to the 4th mayoral election. Upon election, new Mayor Bum-il Kim organized an implementation committee to develop constitutional authorization and operational guidelines for this new body, and made it clear that the Mayor’s Commission on City Government Reform had his full support.

There are 19 members in the Commission: seven NGO representatives, four university professors, and eight public servants, with co-chairs Professor Se-jeong Park and the Vice-Mayor. NGOs currently represented on the Commission include the People’s Solidarity for Public Welfare, the Daegu YMCA, a nationwide accounting firm, and the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement. An NGO activist was hired by the city as part of the support team for the Commission.

The work of the Commission, and the project evolving from their efforts, were highly publicized. NGOs outside of the Commission praised the process and the outcomes, and individual citizens could see that the city was indeed making changes based on the input of the community. All who lived in the metropolitan area benefited from various projects, and the development of smaller projects offered the possibility that other neighborhood and interest groups would get their opportunities as well.

As there are opportunities for city staff to participate in the process outside of their regular duties, numerous lower-level public servants also actively support the work of the Commission.

(a) Strategies

 Describe how and when the initiative was implemented by answering these questions
 a.      What were the strategies used to implement the initiative? In no more than 500 words, provide a summary of the main objectives and strategies of the initiative, how they were established and by whom.
A survey of the city’s image, as rated in five other cities, made it clear that the city of Daegu needed significant change. Discovering that the region’s reputation for conservatism extended beyond social values and political choices, suggesting a lack of modernity and anti-democracy, government leaders realized that incremental adjustments would not bring about the needed results. Even the insiders could see that fresh ideas presented by outside voices would be the only way to bring about significant change.

Each prospective member of the Commission, as well as the mayor himself, probably had differing visions of the Commission. The first task was to identify the types of activities the Commission would undertake – not only in terms of legality, but practicality. As it was important that the Commission be consistent with the nationwide unitary metropolitan cities law and adapt to local government structures, city staff were responsible for development of the formal Commission plan.

Strong and repeated advocacy from the mayor forced senior public officials to take the work of the Commission seriously. Commission staffs are experienced local public servants who are able to recognize and respond to bureaucratic issues before they undermine the proposals, plus one social activist hired to help bridge the gap between civil society and public managers.

Regularly-scheduled monthly and bi-monthly meetings of the Commission and frequent (quarterly) workshops, along with less-formal irregularly-scheduled and variously-located “roundtable talks” on topics of concern to assorted interest groups provide a well-rounded environment for ideas generation and discussion. Commission members individually, and through the staff, seek information on ‘best practices’ from other local governments in Korea and abroad. Expert consultants have been brought in to lead workshops on more technical subjects, and the Commission have taken field visits to investigate top-performing government activities. Talks with groups, such as foreign residents of the city, points out issues that might be missed, such as the need to expand, correct, and make more current the English and Japanese language sections of the city website.

As spokesmen for society, Commission members regularly present ideas raised by ordinary citizens or submitted from numerous informal networks. The Commission is not envisioned as yet another governmental body, but as a microcosm of society. Thus, rather than attempting to force “perfect” ideas through the city administration, the Mayor’s Commission develops innovative concepts with the recognition that city staff can fine-tune these to meet legal, budgetary, and administrative realities.

(b) Implementation

 b.      What were the key development and implementation steps and the chronology? No more than 500 words
The Mayor’s Commission was formally established in October 2006, following deliberations by various working groups and government officials. Naming a recognized local scholar in public administration and the vice-mayor as Co-chairs of the Commission, along with the mayor’s repeated enthusiastic support for the commission, compelled senior public servants to take the work of the group seriously. Nevertheless, it was roughly more than 10 months of finetuning by the Commission itself in terms of defining targets and processes before they were able to move beyond initial recommendations for projects.

No less important was development of the city’s internal process to handle the proposals from the Commission. The Commission is “independent” of the administration, yet “connected” so that the proposals aren’t lost or ignored. Proposals flow through alternating working groups, a mix of department-level specialization and cross-city coordinative and technical/managerial committees. The proposals are tracked by the Deputy Mayor (inside the city system) and the Commission’s Co-chair, who remains outside the bureaucracy. When a proposal has been adopted through approvals and refinements by the various working groups, it will be assigned to the relevant city department for implementation.

In 2007 the first proposals were launched by the city, including the “Good Villages” projects where local sub-communities define projects for local improvements, with local volunteerism a key component. This program has been fully institutionalized, and repeated in the years since, with 13 local projects to date.

The Commission presented a number of proposals that were adopted by the city in 2008, including the “Little Mayors” program, the citizen’s petition for policy discussions, and the privatization scheme.

Some projects have had a much slower development. The Citizen’s Petition was adopted by the Commission in December of 2006. Opinions of various NGOs and civil servants were collected and studied through to April of 2007. Draft regulations were developed for further consultations at this time, and a working committee of 29 NGO representatives and 45 civil servants was formed. Through their work, final regulations for the petition process were executed in March, 2008, and a deliberations committee was appointed in June of that year. Following a public awareness campaign, six petition-based policy discussions were held during 2009 and 2010. While the process was slow, we have seen that an institutionalized process led to a successful outcome (the petition) whereas years of isolated calls for reviews had failed.

One might observe that the Commission has not won “great victories.” But city projects initiated from the Commission’s proposals have received national recognition, e.g., the “Little Mayor” project was recognized by the Minister for Public Administration and Security (with a cash award) for Innovation in Inner-Systems Improvement. Viewed as an ongoing multi-year governance component of the city, it is clear that fundamental institutional change is taking place in the organizational behavior of the city

(c) Overcoming Obstacles

 c.      What were the main obstacles encountered? How were they overcome? No more than 500 words
Public servants have been accustomed to managing according to in-house norms. New proposals entering from those who aren’t immersed in local practices frequently can be tangled in webs of conflicting regulatory schemes and areas of responsibility. Consultation between these departments may be slow and complicated, even with strong support from department heads and the mayor. The challenges may not be intentional foot-dragging by bureaucrats, which can occur, but the disfunctionality of a bureaucratic system designed to prevent mismanagement and promote accuracy through pre-established channels.

Some senior staff has perceived the stated mandate of the Mayor’s Commission as interference with their rights as managers, rights they earned through the traditional seniority system. This became particularly evident in the case of the “Little Mayors” project, where outstanding performance by the entrepreneurial city employee could result in “premature” promotions. Another recommendation of the Commission, relating to development of a performance-driven personnel management system, failed to be accepted by the city due to strong opposition from both senior managers and the labor union.

The inclusion of department heads in working meetings headed by the deputy mayor, along with cross-departmental technical staff meetings, were designed to identify sticking points and develop work-around solutions for projects caught in the bureaucratic maze. Regular communication on the status of proposals and any problem areas enabled the Commission to advocate on behalf of the projects when they were delayed or challenged. The Mayor’s active support when the Commission’s advocacy was insufficient quickly re-educated those bureaucrats who had imagined that the entire concept would soon fade away.

Re-election of Mayor Bum-il Kim and the obvious public support for the projects of the Commission have increased the leverage of the Commission. The media have assisted in the growing awareness by citizens and bureaucrats alike of the “ideas incubation” philosophy and productive findings of the Mayor’s Commission. The role of the Commission is not to mandate change for the city, but to provide another web of constructive tension in the governance practices of city administration.

(d) Use of Resources

 d.      What resources were used for the initiative and what were its key benefits? In no more than 500 words, specify what were the financial, technical and human resources’ costs associated with this initiative. Describe how resources were mobilized
The Mayor’s Commission has a direct staff of four public servants, located within the City Planning and Coordination Bureau. The Commission operates on a budget of roughly 30,000 US Dollars per year, beyond the costs of those public servants. Commission members receive no salaries for their duties, but re provided minor compensation for costs related to their work and a modest meetings allowance.

Commission-proposed projects that are adopted by the city receive budgets and staffing from the relevant departments and are not supervised by the Commission, although individual Commission members do continue to nurture projects and occasionally battle bureaucrats to defend these operations. The projects also develop citizens and experts committees, which require modest support as well.

It should also be recognized that some level of “political capital” has been expended on this project. Personal social capital (goodwill) from Commission members in their dealings with city staffers have also been invested, although many Commission members would report that the payoffs for these investments have been very worthwhile. Similarly, as city staff have come to believe in the Commission and/or specific projects fostered by the Commission, their investment in the scheme has grown beyond the normal responsibilities of a paid bureaucrat. The mayor, too, believes that it was a “good investment” in terms of both productivity in government and popular support for the mayor and city, although we should recognize that his attentions here may have been at the expense of other city projects

Sustainability and Transferability

  Is the initiative sustainable and transferable?
“Pilot” projects and innovation initiatives are often short-lived due to a lack of deep roots and financial or political support. There is much reason for hope that the Mayor’s Commission on City Government Reform will survive many years into the future. Mayor Kim shows no signs of weakening in his resolve for partnership with civil society, and his second term has several years to run (with the possibility of additional terms of office not to be discounted), so the Commission’s roots in city hall grow ever deeper. The budgetary impact of the Commission is relatively minor, although budgetary considerations clearly do impact the viability of some recommendations from the Commission. Professor Park’s energy and advocacy on behalf of the Commission within city hall likewise shows no sign of abetting.

Replicability or transfer of this initiative will require a similar environment, that is, a government chief executive willing to “champion” such a governance project, and one or more recognized “outsiders” willing to devote time and energy into fostering the Commission and its projects. It will also require a civil society ready to support a change in administrative practices. The bureaucratic mindset of Daegu in 2005 was hardly unique in Korea or globally, and new mayors with an aim for change are likewise not uncommon. There are many fertile fields ripe for this style of partnership in governance.

The mechanisms of the Mayor’s Commission are far less important than the ideals. A strong mayor delegates some of his authority to a panel comprised of both government insiders and representatives from civil society and experts, with the mandate to create a change environment through initiating innovative projects that encourage entrenched public servants to rethink their administrative and social paradigms.

Lessons Learned

 What are the impact of your initiative and the lessons learned?
The projects of the Mayor’s Commission on City Government Reform are newsworthy, particularly the Citizen’s Petition, Little Mayors, and Participatory Budgeting, but these should not be mistaken for the more important role of the initiative – to restructure the bureaucratic bias of government towards a more inclusive governance model.

While some battles have been won, the war on bureaucracy may be generational, awaiting the retirement of traditional administrative culture from the public service. Short-term victories are important, they give both civil society and change advocates within and outside government reason for faith in their cause. Losses, too, remind change proponents of the need to stay focused and design innovative projects that can win over administrators. As visibility of the work of the Commission has increased, so too have citizen expectations, which means that the natural delays in implementation may require the Commission changing roles to defend the careful work of city hall.

An evaluation study on the Commission indicates that both public servants and NGOs believe that this initiative is making progress towards a true partnership in governance. Yet change will not come overnight: the Weberian traditions and legalistic frameworks of city hall are stronger than any short-term change advocates.

The Commission has shown, however, that it is possible for a public-private partnership to work at the policy level. Civil society has entered city hall, not in war, but through treaty, and while the armistice is not perfect, it is working. Spending more time with each other, each learns to appreciate the motivations of the other. As one NGO participant on the Commission has stated, “Although I am not yet perfectly satisfied with the public service, I now recognize that there are valid reasons why they can’t satisfy every citizen. I understand that it is a very difficult process.” Awareness of the other’s needs had previously been absent. In the years to come, this appreciation for the challenges and perspectives of the other will become common knowledge, and an absence of partnership will become unthinkable.

Contact Information

Institution Name:   Daegu Metropolitan City
Institution Type:   Government Agency  
Contact Person:   Seok-Mo Nam
Title:   Director of Regulatory Reform and Regal Division  
Telephone/ Fax:   82-53-803-2621
Institution's / Project's Website:   82-53-803-2569
E-mail:   idle207@daegu.go.kr  
Address:   130 Gongpyeongno, Jung-gu
Postal Code:   700-714
City:   Deagu
State/Province:   Daegu
Country:  

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