| 4. In which ways is the initiative creative and innovative?
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Four key strategies were developed at the Lam-Ta-Khong Basin for flood prevention as follows:
First, at provincial level: the DWC was founded to monitor water situations and to deliberate water information from the DPAC under the RIO8, districts, and relevant organizations. The DWC chaired by a governor was the final decision maker to deliver a flood warning to vulnerable areas. This was to avoid getting confused from unjustified information.
Second, at basin level: the basin is divided into three parts including the Upper Lam-Ta-Khong Basin prior to the Lam-Ta-Khong Reservoir, Middle Lam-Ta-Khong Basin, and Lower Lam-Ta-Khong Basin after the Lam-Ta-Khong Reservoir. The upstream LAOs and districts assigned their staff or volunteer to examine the rainfall amount and water level in a waterway and then reported to the DPAC. The DPAC analyzed the upstream data and submitted it to the DWC in order to re-evaluate and issue a flood monitoring or warning from the upstream localities to downstream localities based on mutual criteria. Concurrently, the neighboring towns and villages also exchanged water information during flash floods to stay alert.
Third, at municipality level: Mayor of Nakhon Ratchasima Municipality set a coordinator team to collect water information in the Lam-Ta-Khong River from relevant agencies, e.g. the DWC, the DPAC, Si-Kew Municipality, Sung-Noen Municipality, Kok-Gruad Municipality, and the Lam-Ta-Khong Operation and Maintenance Office. The collected information aided in issuing a monitoring and warning notice at the Nakhon Ratchasima Municipality and Nakhon Ratchasima provincial hospital and to make communities ready to face with an upcoming flood. This aimed to alleviate life and property damage from flood disaster.
Fourth, at the RIO8 level: the RIO8 launched two measures, that is, structural and non-structural measures. The structural measures included construction plans during the year 2011-2015. In 2011, the budget was partially allocated and the construction was incomplete. The non-structural measures were therefore put in place to relieve and resolve the 2011 floods. The non-structural measures involved the establishment of the DPAC to be responsible for analyzing the rainfall and runoff data and sending to the DWC; rain gauge installment covering the whole basin; website development to disseminate water information and warning criteria; and, staff gauge provision used for warning purpose at major basins.
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| 5. Who implemented the initiative and what is the size of the population affected by this initiative?
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Different agencies at Nakhon Ratchasima Province participated in resolving flood disaster as the followings:
First, the upstream LAOs assigned a local staff or volunteer to check rainfall amount and reported to the upstream districts as well as to notifying water level in a watercourse to the downstream LAOs. Second, the upstream districts gathered rainfall amount from the upstream LAOs and forwarded it to the DPAC before 8:00 a.m. every day. Meanwhile, the upstream districts informed a watercourse condition to the downstream districts. Third, public agencies that possessed rain gauges, including the RIO8, the Kao-Yai National Park, the National Park Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department/Nakhon Ratchasima Office, jointly delivered rainfall amount to the DPAC under the RIO8 every day. Fourth, the DPAC under the RIO8 analyzed all data and sent a report to the DWC. Moreover, the DPAC exchanged information via SMS with heads of public agencies as well as posting information on the website, www.rid8.go.th.
Fifth, the DWC received the report of rainfall and runoff amount and flooding conditions of local areas, re-evaluated, and finally gave a flood warning notice based on specified criteria. Sixth, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation/Nakhon Ratchasima Office (DDPM) supported rain gauges and distributed to the upstream LAOs and districts. The DDPM was the core agency to rescue disaster victims. Seventh, Mayor of Nakhon Ratchasima Municipality acted as a coordinator to deliver a warning to flood risk areas in the municipality. Eighth, mass media including television, radio, and local cable TV took information from the DWC and continued disseminating correct and updated information to the public. And, ninth, people collaborated with public agencies to follow the action plans and warning criteria. This resulted in ultimate reduction of life and property damage.
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| 6. How was the strategy implemented and what resources were mobilized?
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There were five resources contributed to mobilize the initiative. First, human resources: a network of 40 staffs from relevant LAOs and districts was created to monitor and report the amount of rainfall and runoff daily. All of them were trained to use apparatus, to fill in a report form, and to understand warning criteria. Personnel from the DPAC and DWC were also informed about details of work procedures and warning criteria. Five technical personnel including irrigation engineers and hydrologists from nearby irrigation offices under the RIO8 were appointed to work at the DPAC during the peak rainfall, from September to November, every year.
Second, resources management: the flow charts of work procedures at the DPAC and DWC were documented to specify responsible persons and work duration at each step. Details of work flow and steps on information exchange among networking staffs were also provided to ease the practices. In addition, authority of each allied agencies was clarified to ensure the smooth operation.
Third, material resources: more rain gauges were supplied to significant local areas, totaling 32 stations, in order to promote real-time report of water situation. Telephones, mobile phones, and facsimiles were used to facilitate data exchange. Existing personal computers and software, e.g. Internet and Microsoft Office, were applied to process data. The RIO8’s website was initiated to encourage public access to water information.
Fourth, financial resources: the budgets, US$2,000, for buying rain gauges allocated by the DDPM. Furthermore, the regular budgets, US$6,667 and US$10,000, of the RIO8 were allocated for website design and overtime allowances for staff at the DPAC, respectively.
Fifth, technology resources: the RIO8 was keen on organizing a database of daily and annual rainfall to be used for flood analysis as well as setting data processing for flood warning. The RIO8 wrote a program that automatically converted rainfall amount into runoff. This helped speed up a work process. The RIO8, moreover, identified flood warning criteria at the locality and basin levels as well as providing staff gauges for warning at major basins. Finally, the RIO8 used diverse means to disseminate water information, for example, telephone, SMS, facsimile, radio, and website.
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| 7. Who were the stakeholders involved in the design of the initiative and in its implementation?
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The year 2011 was marked as the first year of change in flood disaster preparedness and relief at the Lam-Ta-Khong Basin. This leaded to four concrete outputs that contributed to the success of the initiative as follows:
First, forming a network of public participation: the RIO8 generated a local network, so called volunteers, to exchange data and flood warning. The volunteers were trained to assist public officers in collecting water information, monitoring a staff gauge, and passing a notice of flood warning to adjacent areas. This built a sense of unity among local residents, thus enhancing performance in monitoring and evacuation. The network covered the areas of 40 sub-districts at the Lam-Ta-Khong Basin. In the past, data collection used to be done solely by public irrigation staff.
Second, work integrating between public agencies: data and flood warning delivery from the upstream LAOs and districts to the downstream LAOs and districts helped reinforce data accuracy and prompt response to the water situation. The real-time data facilitated reliable water analysis that was the base for deliberating a flood warning.
Third, establishing a clear work system: the work flow chart was made to clarify work procedures, responsible agencies, and contact persons at each step. The DPAC and DWC were founded to serve as core function in analysis and command, respectively. Flood prevention and mitigation was much effective due to clear roles and responsibilities among integrated parties. Work redundancy was completely resolved. This made the DWC be able to quicker issue a notice of flood warning to the public 72 hours in advance compared to 6-12 hours warning in advance before the initiative was introduced.
Fourth, disseminating information to the public: before the initiative, flooding always brought chaos to the locality. There was no source to re-check water information and flood warning for the general public. After the initiative, the DPAC launched a website to ease access to water information. A notice of flood warning was frequently announced via television, radio, and cable TV.
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| 8. What were the most successful outputs and why was the initiative effective?
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The following six systems were introduced to periodically monitor and evaluate the implementation. First, verification of raw data: the daily amount of rainfall and runoff from the network was reported by filling in an agreed form. The form included a runoff table for the whole basin. However, relevant LAOs and districts just provided data for their own areas. The runoff table indicated water movement in the basin. The Database Team settled by the DPAC could easily notice irrational data from the runoff table and re-check with related LAOs and districts.
Second, verification of data analysis: analyzed data would compare to not only raw data from different locations, but also to data analyzed by relevant agencies. The Data Analysis Team formed by the DPAC was in charge of this verification in order to ensure reliable analysis before passing to the DWC.
Third, data verification before issuing a flood warning: the DWC would justify received data from the DPAC with other sources of water information, for example, the Thai Meteorological Department and the National Disaster Warning Center. This helped the DWC to deliberate a notice of flood warning to the public.
Fourth, operation verification: after commanding, district offices would collect operation incurred and reported to the DWC that served as a monitoring agent of related activities including flood warning, evacuation, and economic zone protection.
Fifth, data of rainfall amount and runoff from different districts would be coordinated and compiled by the Coordinating and Reporting Team under the DPAC. This team helped conclude the flooding situation in each basin before submitting information to the DWC.
Sixth, Data compiled and analyzed by the Data Analysis Team under the DPAC would be verified and transferred to be a database in GIS and MIS. The database assisted in disseminating a flood situation, issuing a notice of flood warning, rescuing, and updating a flood situation. The situation update was helpful for executives to deliberate the next plan and measure.
During the period of peak rainfall, staff of the DPAC worked 24 hours. They were exposed to the public's water information by means of information exchange, phone answering. This facilitated the staff to easily recheck data and analysis results, thus modifying the subsequent water analysis properly.
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| 9. What were the main obstacles encountered and how were they overcome?
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Four main obstacles were encountered during implementation as the followings:
First, there were not enough rain gauges to cover the whole areas of basin. The RIO8 then produced temporary rain gauges and gave to the upstream LAOs and districts. In addition, the workshops regarding how to use the rain gauges and how to report data were arranged for relevant staff and volunteers by the RIO8. Later, the DDPM allocated budget to buy the rain gauges for the needed LAOs and districts.
Second, personnel of associated agencies had been reshuffled or moved every year. As a result, the RIO8 prepared a work manual and distributed to related LAOs and districts for self-study. The RIO8, moreover, posted on their website and called for a meeting with associated agencies to explain the work procedures.
Third, some upstream LAOs and districts delayed to report rainfall amount, thus impeding data analysis by the DPAC. The governor not only set a weekly meeting to follow-up work performance of those agencies, but also indicated the contact numbers of all responsible persons in a document. This document was distributed to every agency associated.
Fourth, the DPAC under the RIO8 was an ad hoc center operating from September to November every year. The center asked for cooperation from specialists who held main duties at different offices under the RIO8. The ad hoc center was unfortunately viewed as secondary duties by the specialists. The director of the RIO8 then officially assigned related specialists as a working team of the DPAC. The assignment ensured clear roles and responsibilities of the working team.
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