| 4. In which ways is the initiative creative and innovative?
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The government-owned micro-enterprises were prototyped in two Union Parishads of the country in 2007. This prototype was expanded to 30 Union Parishads in 2008 to inform the strategy of local variation with regard to demand for popular public services. A formal partnership between LGD and UNDP’s A2I program was struck in 2008; this partnership was also geared towards building confidence of government stakeholders in adopting ICTs in their day-to-day works. Encouraged by its prototype success, UISCs were launched in 100 Union Parishads in 2009, and subsequently, in all 4,500+ Union Parishads of the country by late 2010. Each UISC, which is essentially a micro-enterprise, is being run by two young local entrepreneurs – a woman and a man – under the supervision of a local advisory board headed by the Union Parishad Chairman. These entrepreneurs received computer literacy training in order to meet the demand for information and services through indigenous use of ICTs.
The combination of people with experience working in government, NGOs and private sector was one of the most vital strengths that led to the UISCs establishment. It is important to note that this was an extremely difficult exercise which aspired to create a ‘mind meld’ of people with sometimes conflicting belief systems, divergent understanding about urgencies and priorities, and possibly most important of all, radically diverse sense of incentives and career aspirations. However, everyone was unified around a simple strategy aimed at taking services to ‘citizens’ doorsteps.’ Most of the time, bold decisions were made in the interest of capitalizing on the momentum; for example, the target year for expanding UISCs country-wide was 2012, and yet it was completed by 2010, largely owing to its political (top-down) and demand-driven (bottom-up) attributes.
This success can be explained by two factors. First, the series of meetings organized at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the political nerve center of the government, and discussions led by the Cabinet Division, its bureaucratic nerve center, helped to add additional urgency to UISCs’ activities. The key elements of the action plan related to reviewing existing structures serving underserved communities. Second, a needs assessment exercise was done in order to depict scope for enabling government departments in transforming some of their services into e-services. For example, e-Purjee system, prototyped in one sugar mill, delivers purchase orders to over 200,000 sugarcane farmers from all 15 sugar mills of the government. Sugarcane farmers, after receiving text from the sugar mill, have the option of collecting a paper copy from their nearest UISC, thereby saving them time, costs and visits in getting a purchase order. The strategy blended in a mix of activities including government, non-state organizations such as telecom operators and sugarcane farmers, in implementing UISCs across Bangladesh’s rural areas.
In both cases, UNDP’s A2I program played a pivotal role by bringing in the concerned stakeholders under one umbrella and showcasing the potential of small service delivery improvements through ICTs, which could be delivered through UISCs; in other words, right at the rural citizens’ doorsteps. Gradually, by 2011, LGD became the main driver coordinating, monitoring and leading UISCs’ activities.
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| 5. Who implemented the initiative and what is the size of the population affected by this initiative?
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A network of partners, comprising of both government and non-state actors, were involved in the design, implementation and in the nationwide scaling up of UISCs. Through formal MoUs and other partnership arrangements, they are also playing an active role in ensuring the sustainability of these one-stop information and service outlets. The initial design drew lessons from existing structures of CICs. The difference of UISCs with the latter lies in its legal design –UISCs are de jure to be made available in every Union Parishad. LGD consulted with NGOs, such as Grameen Bank and others in formulating a design for the UISCs implementation. This analysis revealed the urgency for involving government stakeholders so that public information could hold intrinsic value for its users. The LGD drew on these lessons in the implementation of UISCs through gradual scaling up and e-transformation of public services that could be delivered through these centers.
UISCs in Bangladesh are operating under the public-private-partnership (PPP) modality. Private sector is considered a key partner in each of the initiatives undertaken by UISCs. For instance, mobile banking opportunities offered by private commercial banks through branchless mode of operation, has enabled many UISCs to remain financially solvent. These private banks design training programs for UISCs’ entrepreneurs so that they are equipped to provide the service with adequate skills and knowledge. This has proven to be an innovative approach that helps micro-enterprises draw investment from business communities and public agencies. A wide range of services are being offered by both government organizations – land records, birth registration, telemedicine, life insurance, overseas job application – as well as private sector companies – mobile banking, English learning, telephone services, etc. This depth and breadth of the PPP around UISCs is unprecedented.
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| 6. How was the strategy implemented and what resources were mobilized?
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The prototype phase in 2007 which established two UISCs was funded by the “Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund” to the tune of USD 100,000. A team of five with background in social mobilization at the grassroots level ran the then initiative. Partnership was established with a UNDP-funded initiative named “Learning and Innovation” component of the larger government and World Bank funded “Local Governance Strengthening Program” (LGSP) which focused on introducing participatory budget in Union Councils. This partnership facilitated a dialogue with the LGD of the government to expand the prototype to thirty Union Councils in 2008 to understand regional variation that would be important for country-wide upsaling. The expanded prototype with a budget of about USD 487,000 was funded by multiple sources: 9% from the UISC entrepreneurs, 14% from the Union Councils’ own budget, 4% from LGSP, and 72% from the UNDP-funded A2I program. Much of the funding from A2I was used to generate locally relevant livelihood content in the vernacular with regards to agriculture, non-farm activities, health, education, disaster management and other areas. This aspect was vital to make these centers attractive and relevant to the target citizens. Some of the funding was used for generating local awareness amongst citizens. Funds from the other sources were used for capacity development of UISCs’ entrepreneurs, Union Council officials, and local volunteers.
The expanded prototype in thirty locations in 2008 provided deeper understanding to develop a model for nationwide scaling up in 2009 and 2010. The big push for nationwide replication came in 2010 with nearly USD 40 million in setup costs for 4,500+ centers, capacity development of over 9,000 entrepreneurs and local and national level awareness development campaigns in the media. This large fund was pooled from government and World Bank funded LGSP, local tax revenue of Union Councils, discretionary funds at the disposal of government administrators, who were responsible for monitoring the quality of service delivery. In a few hundred locations, entrepreneurs made small to medium sized investment to supplement funding from other sources in order to ensure that they had the right infrastructure beyond what the government had provided.
Since the nationwide launching in 2010, the primary funding to run these centers came from the earnings of the entrepreneurs, who regularly pay for internet costs, maintenance and upkeep of all technology equipment and local publicity. Various public agencies and private organizations introducing new services pay for the capacity development of entrepreneurs. The hosting of these centers was an in-kind support provided by the Union Councils since no rent is charged. Recently, a government trust fund paid for solar panels in order to support these centers during frequent power outages. The LGD and UNDP-funded A2I program at the PMO collaborate to support the UISCs with new partnerships at the national level, national publicity and policy reform necessary to sustain these centers. This support is instrumental in catalyzing many innovations in different government agencies towards decentralization of their services through UISCs.
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| 7. Who were the stakeholders involved in the design of the initiative and in its implementation?
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The principal approach to making UISCs successful depended on a collaborative framework set up since its conception in 2007. This allowed for cost sharing in original establishment and continual aggregation of new services from public agencies and private organizations. The five major outputs attributable to UISCs’ success are the following:
(I) Infrastructure development for decentralized service delivery: The 4,500+ centers allowed a decentralized infrastructure for taking vital government and private sector services closer to citizens’ doorsteps. The 35 km hike to a district office to access a service was reduced to 2-3 km from a rural, underprivileged citizen’s home. Internet connectivity infrastructure has been expanded by private sector telecom operators to cover all UISCs.
(II) Citizens’ awareness and demand creation: In view of UISCs novelty as a mechanism for connecting the bottom millions with government offices, it became imperative to carry out country-wide and local-level awareness campaigns. These programs were designed to augment awareness about UISCs and create demand for decentralized public service delivery. An evidence to demonstrate the campaign’s success as a demand creating vehicle is that in 2013, there are 53 services being delivered through UISCs whilst the figure stood at 20 in 2010.
(III) Skills development: Capacity development initiatives targeted at raising ICT skills level of government service providers both at national and local levels. In operating UISCs, entrepreneurs require some basic ICT skills. LGD, in partnership with A2I, offered ICT training to nearly 9,000 + entrepreneurs, half of whom were women, in order to enable them to provide e-service.
(IV) Service delivery innovation: Onset of UISCs triggered a scope for all service providers, both public and private, to link their services with these one-stop information and service delivery centers. Many services were transformed into e-services which could be provided right at the citizens’ doorsteps (e.g. e-purjee, online utility payments, etc). The PPP modality allowed mobilizing comparative advantages of concerned stakeholders which helped to simplify service delivery process by opening up access from UISCs, both for submitting and receiving public services, e.g. land registration, mobile banking, life insurance, etc.
(V) Locally meaningful service delivery: Based on the needs assessment done at the local level, a national level e-content repository in the vernacular, www.infoskosh.gov.bd, was launched. This information portal houses livelihood contents in the areas of agriculture, health, employment, education, migration, etc which is tailored contents to meet the needs of particular farmers, workers, students, etc.
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| 8. What were the most successful outputs and why was the initiative effective?
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In no more than 400 words describe how you monitored and evaluated the implementation of the strategy.
(I) An UISC Activity Management System (UAMS) is in place which helps to monitor performance of the UISCs on a daily basis. The entrepreneurs report on their every day earnings and the number of services being rendered through their respective micro-enterprises to the citizens. The UAMS helps to identify inactive UISCs and at the same time address factors undermining their sustainability.
(II) UISCs are connected with the district headquarter and, as a result, the Cabinet Division, secretariat for the entire Cabinet, is also able to monitor and evaluate the success of UISCs implementation. The Cabinet Division generates a monthly assessment report of the UISCs. Data is collected through the district and sub-district offices.
(III) UISC Blog, a built-in monitoring and evaluation system, is working as a checking system on the entrepreneurs’ activities and their works in respective localities. This virtual platform is being applied to carry out plot surveys on specific issues of UISCs’ concern. In addition, anecdotal evidences are being collected through this Blog which is playing a significant role in statistical interpretations. In particular, the UISC Blog is helping to better understand the urgency and scope for service delivery transformation at the lowest government tier.
(IV) In October 2013, almost coinciding with third year anniversary of the UISCs, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) independently carried out a census on the 4,500+ UISCs to evaluate their performance in taking public services to citizens’ doorsteps. Over the last couple of years, the number of services being provided through the government backed micro-enterprises has witnessed an exponential growth and it became impeding to carry out a census in order to develop a strategic plan, identify future directions and possible interventions for the sustainability of UISCs. The report is going to be made publicly available by January 2014. The findings will allow exploration of more services connecting citizens with the entire government machinery.
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| 9. What were the main obstacles encountered and how were they overcome?
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Implementation of UISCs overcame three broad challenges:
Bureaucratic resistance: The prevailing archaic public service delivery model poses fundamental challenges to promoting access for socially disadvantaged groups. Resistance towards change, from bureaucracy to vested interest groups, is not an uncommon phenomenon. Generally, innovation for a civil servant in a developing country like Bangladesh would imply a fairly major penalty, let alone any commensurate reward. UISCs initiative was able to overcome this resistance due to the risk space created for public service innovators which played a catalytic role in triggering a change in their values, attitudes and skills.
Capacity of service providers: One of the key gaps identified during UISCs formulation process pertained to the capacity of public officials, in conceiving the usage of ICTs for improving service delivery. The ministry-level meetings helped to provide a thinking and risk-taking space for public service innovators and thereby allowed them to experiment with service delivery innovations. It is important to conduct regular capacity building exercises, incorporating relevant agendas for discussion, in order to boost the confidence and capacity of service providers and more pertinently, for sustaining the change momentum.
Weak broadband infrastructure: Like many developing countries, internet in Bangladesh has witnessed phenomenal growth. Although facing many constraints in expanding internet access and use, development of the internet and information technology are receiving high government priorities because of their demonstrated impact in connecting citizens with the government.
Highest level of political buy-in is of paramount importance in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and organizational resistance to change. Work on UISCs took-off from the apex political authority, i.e., the PMO and received strong support from the Cabinet Division. Nurturing this symbiotic relationship proved critically important to garner political momentum required for enabling policy reforms for widespread replication, coupled with developing capacity thousands of service provider personnel.
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